By U. Dasin
There is a profound insight in the statement attributed to the founding father of Singapore — Lee Kuan Yew — on the transplantation of Western political institutions into societies whose historical evolution had been radically different from that of the West. The West, he understood, had developed its secular institutions over centuries, against the background of its own particular history of individualism, citizenship, class formation and nation-building. Yet, once Western powers had exported those institutions to the rest of the world — often after having first extracted or expropriated its resources — they tended to assume that the institutions themselves were universal and that the societies receiving them would eventually conform to their logic.
Lee Kuan Yew’s point was not that modern institutions were undesirable. It was that institutions do not float free of history. Beneath the apparently rational and universal structures of the modern state remain older loyalties: family, community, ethnicity, religion, language, memory and collective identity. These do not disappear because a constitution is adopted, a parliament established or independence proclaimed. Indeed, when historical identities are suppressed in the name of an abstract universalism, they have a tendency to return in other forms.
Freud’s famous observation about repression has an unexpected political resonance here: what is driven out of consciousness does not necessarily disappear; it returns, displaced and transformed. The same can happen to collective identities. The modern state may declare all citizens equal, but equality proclaimed at the level of political institutions does not automatically dissolve the historical inequalities, memories and communal structures inherited from the past.
There is an additional irony in the history of Western modernity. The language of universal equality arrived relatively late in the story. It emerged after centuries in which European powers had built empires, appropriated territories and resources, and organised populations according to profound hierarchies of race, class and civilisation. For the populations subsequently incorporated into the modern nation-state, therefore, the arrival of the universal language of equality could not simply erase the material and historical differences produced by the preceding order.
This is one reason why the simple transplantation of Western institutions has produced such uneven results. The problem is not necessarily the institutions themselves. It is the assumption that institutions can be detached from the historical and social conditions that produced them.
Mauritius: A different postcolonial reality
Mauritius presents an especially complicated version of this problem because it does not fit neatly into the familiar postcolonial binary of coloniser and indigenous population. There was no indigenous Mauritian population that existed as a coherent national community before colonialism and could subsequently reclaim its sovereignty. Mauritius was instead constituted through successive movements and displacements of people: enslaved Africans and Malagasy, indentured labourers from different parts of India, migrants from China, Europeans and others, all incorporated into a colonial order characterised by profound inequalities of status, wealth and power.
Consequently, Mauritian decolonisation cannot simply mean the restoration of an original identity that colonialism suppressed. There is no single precolonial Mauritian identity waiting to be recovered. The Mauritian historical experience is instead one of multiple populations becoming, over time, a society. This distinction matters enormously for the way we understand the present debate over Kreol.
The Kreol question
The proposal to begin discussing the introduction of Kreol in the National Assembly is, on its face, an eminently defensible democratic proposition. A language spoken extensively in the everyday life of the country should not be treated as inherently inferior simply because the colonial state elevated other languages into formal institutional domains. Indeed, the parliamentary recognition of Kreol can be understood as part of the continuing democratisation of Mauritian public life.
But the question becomes much more complicated if the matter is framed through the familiar binary of colonial language versus indigenous language. Kreol is certainly a language of Mauritius. But the historical meaning of Mauritius cannot be reduced to Kreol, any more than the history of its population can be reduced to a single ethnic experience. This is where the exceptional complexity of the Mauritian case needs to be acknowledged.
What does it mean to speak of an “indigenous” language in a society whose populations were themselves brought together through slavery, indentureship, migration and colonial structures? What happens when the legitimate recognition of one historically marginalised identity is interpreted, consciously or otherwise, as requiring the marginalisation of other historically constituted identities? These are not semantic questions. They go to the heart of nation-building.
A plurality of histories and identities
For the descendants of indentured populations, for example, “Indian” is hardly a sufficient description of the historical inheritance they carry. The linguistic and cultural histories of Bhojpuri, Tamil, Telugu, Marathi and other communities are distinct. They have generated their own literary, religious, musical and cultural traditions, while simultaneously participating in the making of a distinctly Mauritian society.
This plurality is visible if we care to look: Bihar Diwas, Maharashtra Day, Telugu cultural celebrations and Tamil Heritage celebrations are not simply exercises in religious or folkloric nostalgia. Nor are Cavadee, Holi and Ganesh Chaturthi merely religious festivals in a narrow sense. They are immense collective performances through which language, music, dance, food, dress, ritual, memory and social relations are reproduced and transmitted between generations.
Culture is lived.
It is performed.
It is remembered.
And people understandably become anxious when they believe that the recognition of one identity is being achieved at the expense of another. This is why the distinction between language and ethnicity becomes so important in the Kreol debate. Kreol can be understood as a language, a lingua franca, a literary medium, a language of popular culture and, potentially, a powerful expression of a shared Mauritian inheritance. But none of these propositions automatically makes Kreol the exclusive linguistic expression of Mauritian identity, still less the cultural property of a single community.
Indeed, there is a particularly important distinction to be made between Kreol as a common language of Mauritius and Kreol as an ethnic marker. The former can unite. The latter can divide.
This distinction is especially significant when we recall the work of Dev Virahsawmy, for whom Morisien could signify something larger than the linguistic possession of one community: a collective inheritance produced through the historical encounter of different peoples and languages. In that conception, the language itself becomes evidence of Mauritius’s hybridity. The danger comes when the semantics of language and race are quietly conflated. Once Kreol becomes identified primarily with a particular ethnic community, the very people who might otherwise embrace its wider national significance may begin to fear that they are being asked to exchange one identity for another.
What does decolonisation really mean?
And this brings us to perhaps the most important question of all: what exactly do we mean by decolonisation?
Decolonisation does not end with the lowering of one flag and the raising of another. Independence is a constitutional event. Decolonisation is a much longer historical process. It involves the restructuring of economic power, educational opportunity, cultural prestige, institutional representation, land ownership, social mobility, knowledge systems and the psychological inheritance of colonial hierarchy.
To equate decolonisation primarily with the introduction of Kreol into Parliament would therefore be to reduce an immense historical problem to a single symbolic intervention. The introduction of Kreol may be desirable. But it is not, by itself, decolonisation.
Indeed, there is a danger in allowing symbolic recognition to substitute for structural transformation. This is where Mauritius needs to resist another imported intellectual binary: the assumption that there must be one authentic postcolonial subject — the indigenous, the colonised, the subaltern — and that once that subject has been recognised, the work of decolonisation has been accomplished.
There was never a single Mauritian subaltern
The Mauritian subaltern was never singular. There were — and remain — subalterns, with different histories, languages, religions and memories. Their experiences of colonialism overlapped, but they were not identical.
The indentured labourer from Bihar did not arrive with precisely the same history as the Tamil or Telugu labourer; the enslaved African did not occupy the same position as the Chinese migrant; and none of these histories can simply be collapsed into a single postcolonial identity.
This does not diminish the importance of Kreol. It makes the recognition of Kreol more intellectually demanding. The challenge is to recognise it without requiring anyone else to disappear.
Perhaps this is where Lee Kuan Yew’s insight about ethnicity becomes useful again. His achievement in Singapore was not that he abolished ethnicity. He did something more difficult: he acknowledged ethnicity as a powerful social reality while attempting to prevent ethnicity from becoming the organising principle of the state.
Singapore’s lesson, adapted rather than copied, is therefore not “suppress ethnic identity”. It is almost the opposite: recognise identities fully, while refusing to make any single identity the definition of the nation.
Beyond the hyphen
A Mauritian can be Mauritian-Tamil, Mauritian-Telugu, Mauritian-Marathi, Mauritian-Bihari, Mauritian-Creole, Mauritian-Chinese, Mauritian-Muslim, Mauritian-Hindu, Mauritian-Christian — or simply Mauritian without feeling compelled to specify the second half of the hyphen.
The hyphen need not signify division. It can signify layering.
It can say: I have inherited this history, and I also belong to this nation.
But there is an equally legitimate Mauritian who may not wish to define herself through a hyphen at all. She may inhabit several cultural worlds simultaneously and consider them all part of her inheritance without allowing any one of them to become her political identity. The state must have room for both.
This may be the real challenge before us today: not how to eliminate communal identities, but how to prevent any one of them from claiming exclusive ownership of the national identity.
The answer is therefore neither the old fiction of a completely post-ethnic Mauritius nor the newer temptation to divide the nation into competing claims of historical authenticity. The strongest Mauritian identity may ultimately be the one that does not demand the disappearance of all the others.
Mauritius should not be forced into a binary that was never made for it.




